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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
2A- 9/21/93 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU CASE NO. S-0002 
for a determination pursuant to 
Section 212 of the Civil Service Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Pursuant to §212 of the Civil Service Law (CSL), the County of 
Nassau (County) has submitted an application by which it seeks a 
determination that County Ordinance No. 549-1981, as amended on 
August 9, 1993, by Ordinance No. 312-1993, is substantially 
equivalent to the provisions and procedures set forth in CSL Article 
14 with respect to the State. The amendment brings the County's 
local law into conformity with CSL §209.2 and CSL §209.4 as amended 
by Chapter 485 of the Laws of 1990 and Chapter 723 of the Laws of 
1991, by extending compulsory interest arbitration to detective 
investigators and criminal investigators employed in the office of 
the district attorney. 
Having reviewed the application, and having determined that the 
subject local law, as amended, is substantially equivalent to the 
provisions and procedures set forth in CSL Article 14 with respect to 
the State, 
IT IS ORDERED that the application of the County of Nassau be, 
and it hereby is, approved. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
Pauline R. KinselJ.a, chairperson hr. 
:er L. Eisenberg, Membe 
2B- 9/21/93 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
NASSAU LOCAL 830, AFSCME, LOCAL 1000, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10 629 
COUNTY OP NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
BEE & EISMAN (PETER A. BEE of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Nassau Local 830, AFSCME, Local 
1000, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) dismissing its charge that the County of Nassau (County) 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it changed the procedures for scheduling unit 
employees' vacation time. 
The charge in issue involves the procedures for granting 
vacation days, or fractions thereof, on a request-by-request 
basis. Until September 1988, requests could be made at any time 
to the tour commander who would consider the request in light of 
staffing needs. By Sheriffs' Order Number: 31-88, unit employees 
in the Security Unit of the Sheriffs' Department had to submit 
their requests to the personnel office at least seventy-two hours 
before the date or dates requested. 
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The ALJ decision now on appeal follows our reversal and 
remand of the ALJ's earlier decision.-7 Oh remand, the ALJ 
granted the County's motion to dismiss the charge on the ground 
that §9-2.2 of the parties' contract permitted the County's 
action and waived any further right of CSEA to negotiate. Under 
that section of the contract, the County has the right to 
"promulgate departmental practices, procedures, rules and 
regulations" so long as under §5 of the contract they do not 
"conflict with, exceed nor supersede this Agreement". 
CSEA argues that the several other decisions relied upon by 
the ALJ in which we found a waiver by agreement-7 did not 
involve an interpretation of §9-2.2, but of the County's rights 
under a management rights clause which gave the County the right 
to regulate work schedules. CSEA argues, therefore, that the 
ALJ's reliance on those cases is misplaced. Section 9-2.2 of the 
contract, according to CSEA, gives the County the right only to 
promulgate rules affecting internal management practices and 
procedures and is too broad to constitute a waiver of any 
bargaining rights regarding terms and conditions of employment. 
-'In our first decision in this case, we reversed the ALJ's 
dismissal of the charge for lack of jurisdiction and, 
alternatively, as untimely filed. 23 PERB 53051, rev'g 2 3 PERB 
54550 (1990). We did not, however, have before us then any issue 
regarding the merits of either CSEA's or the County's 
allegations. Therefore, contrary to CSEA's argument, there is 
nothing in our decision remanding the case to the ALJ suggesting 
any disposition on the issue of whether CSEA waived the right to 
negotiate vacation scheduling procedures. 
^See cases reported at 24 PERB 53027 (1991); 18 PERB 53034 
(1985); 13 PERB 53053 (1980); 12 PERB 53105 (1979); and 12 PERB 
53049 (1979). 
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The County argues in its response that the ALT reached the 
correct conclusion of law and that her decision should be 
affirmed. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ALJ's 
decision. In affirming the ALJ's decision, however, we find it 
unnecessary to consider the meaning or effect of §9-2.2 of the 
parties' contract. 
It is well-established that a duty to bargain regarding 
terms and conditions of employment can be satisfied and any 
further right to bargain regarding those subjects can be waived 
by agreement of the parties. The question presented, therefore, 
is whether the language of the parties' contract establishes a 
sufficiently plain and clear grant of right to the County to 
change procedures affecting employees' vacation time, and thereby 
effect a corresponding waiver of CSEA's bargaining rights. In 
that regard, §42-4(a) of the parties' contract provides that 
"vacation time shall be granted only in accordance with the 
administrative needs of the department." The parties did not 
offer any evidence regarding the meaning or history of any of the 
relevant contract provisions. We are, therefore, required to 
discern the parties' intent from the language of the contract 
alone. As written, §42-4(a) gives the County the right to grant 
vacation time consistent with its administrative needs. In the 
absence of evidence defining "administrative needs", the term 
must be interpreted in its ordinary sense, and is, thus, a broad 
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grant of power to the County. The departmental rule requiring 
three days' advance notice to its personnel department is not 
inconsistent with the County's perception of its administrative 
needs. Therefore, the scheduling changes effected by the 
departmental order in issue were covered by the language and 
agreement embodied in §42-4(a). 
Our affirmance of the ALJ's decision is entirely consistent 
with our view that general, nonspecific management rights clauses 
or zipper clauses do not usually constitute effective waivers of 
bargaining rights in the context of an employer's unilateral 
change of a term and condition of employment.-' The County's 
right to assign vacation times, only to the extent the grant is 
consistent with its administrative needs, is no less specific 
than its right to regulate work schedules, the latter of which, 
as already noted,-' has been found by us to establish a waiver 
of bargaining rights regarding a number of different changes in 
employees' work schedules. 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's exceptions are 
denied and the AKJ's decision is affirmed. 
^See. e.g.. County of Onondaga. 77 A.D.2d 783, 13 PERB 57011 
(4th Dep't 1980), conf'g 12 PERB [^3035 (1979); Onondaga-Madison 
BOCES, 13 PERB J[3015 (1980). 
See cases cited supra note 2. 
Board - U-10629 -5 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
that the charge be, and it hereby 
2C- 9/21/93 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ALFRED A. DEGALL, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
STATE OF NEW YORK (EMPLOYEE HEALTH 
SERVICES and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION), 
Respondent. 
USHER PILLER, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD W. 
MCDOWELL of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Alfred A. 
Degall to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After 
a hearing, the ALJ dismissed Degall's charge against the State of 
New York (Employee Health Services and Department of 
Transportation) (State) which claims that the State violated 
§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it required him to submit to a psychiatric examination 
allegedly in retaliation for his participation in a grievance 
meeting on September 3, 1991. 
The ALJ found that the State was not improperly motivated in 
ordering Degall to submit to a psychiatric examination pursuant 
to §72 of the Civil Service Law. The ALJ found that the State 
had decided before Degall's involvement in the September 3 
grievance meeting that he had exhibited behaviors warranting 
CASE NO. U-13458 
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medical examination. Although certain of these behaviors were 
exhibited during the processing of Degall's grievance, the ALJ 
held that the State could properly use those to buttress its 
request to the Employee Health Service (EHS) to have Degall 
referred for psychiatric examination. 
In his exceptions, Degall argues that it was a September 9 
letter from the State, after his participation in the grievance 
meeting, which caused EHS to schedule him for a psychiatric 
examination. That letter refers to Degall's behavior at the 
grievance meeting and he argues that the State may not rely in 
any way upon any behavior exhibited in conjunction with the 
prosecution of a grievance. Degall otherwise argues that the 
State's claimed reasons for requesting a psychiatric evaluation 
were pretextual. 
The State in its response argues that the ALJ's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are correct in all material respects 
and that his decision should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
It is clear from our review of the record that the State had 
legitimate reasons to question Degall's mental and physical 
health from behaviors he exhibited both within and without the 
grievance context. The State properly relied upon all 
manifestations of questionable behavior regardless of the context 
in which those behaviors arose. An employee's conduct during 
engagement in protected activities certainly can be considered by 
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an employer if it has a bearing on the employee's continuing 
ability to perform his or her job.^ 
Even were we to disregard Degall's behavior during the 
grievance meeting, we find, in agreement with the ALJ, that his 
earlier behaviors had convinced the State of the need to have 
Degall examined. There is nothing in the record which persuades 
us that the State's asserted reasons for examining Degall were in 
any way pretextual. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed and the exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
Pauline R.Kinse'lla, 
WUjU^ 
Chairperson 
Y, 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member/ 
EricAT. Schmertz, Memb 
1/ S e e , e . g . , S t a t e of New York fOMRDD) , 24 PERB 5[3036 (1991) 
2D- 9 /21 /93 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
FRANKFORT-SCHUYLER TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14116 
FRANKFORT-SCHUYLER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JOSEPH M. POWER, for Charging Party 
HARTER, SECREST & EMERY (JAMES P. BURNS III of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Frankfort-
Schuyler Central School District (District) to a decision by the 
Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director) sustaining a charge filed by 
the Frankfort-Schuyler Teachers Association (Association) that 
the District had violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally assigning student 
supervisory duties to teachers represented by the Association 
during what had previously been duty-free time.-7 
The Association also alleged that the District had violated 
the Act by unilaterally imposing a record-keeping 
requirement on unit employees. The Assistant Director found 
that the District's action violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the Act 
and ordered the District's imposition of the requirement be 
rescinded. No exceptions have been taken to this aspect of 
his decision. 
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The matter was decided on a stipulated record and neither 
party filed a memorandum of law. The Administrative Law Judge 
(ALT) who conducted the conference confirmed the parties7 
stipulation of fact in a post-conference letter. That letter 
notes that the matter was being processed "for decision on the 
pleadings and the following facts stipulated to by the parties at 
the conference." The charge deals with a memorandum issued by 
the District's Superintendent of Schools, Frank A. Saraceno, on 
August 31, 1992, stating: "Teachers at the elementary schools 
are expected to be at their duty stations at 8:00 AM, as students 
will be dismissed from the cafeteria at 8:00 AM to go to the 
classrooms. Instruction starts at 8:15 AM at West Frankfort 
[Elementary School] and 8:25 AM at Reese Road [Elementary 
School]." The charge alleges that "[e]lementary teachers at 
Reese Road Elementary School have heretofore been free of any 
duty station responsibilities from 8:00 a.m. to 8:10 a.m." 
(emphasis in the original). The District's answer admitted the 
truth of that allegation "until September of 1992, after which 
date the practice at West Frankfort Elementary School, that all 
teachers report to their classrooms at 8:00 a.m. to supervise 
students, was extended to the Reese Road Elementary School." The 
stipulation drafted by the ALT stated, in relevant part, that: 
2. the at-issue employees at Reese Road Elementary 
School had, prior to the change reflected in paragraph 
3 of the at-issue memo, ten minutes of free time from 
8:00 a.m. to 8:10 a.m. each work day; 
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3. pursuant to the at-issue change reflected in 
paragraph 3 of the at-issue memo, the District has 
replaced that free time with supervisory duties; 
The parties further agreed that neither would file a brief. 
Thereafter, the Assistant Director issued his decision finding 
that the reduction of employees' duty-free time must be 
negotiated prior to implementation and, because the District had 
acted unilaterally to eliminate what it had conceded was duty-
free time, it had violated the Act. He ordered that the practice 
of allowing teachers at Reese Road free time from 8:00 a.m. to 
8:10 a.m. be restored and that those teachers at Reese Road who 
had to forego such free time be paid at their contractual rate of 
pay for each day they did so, with interest at the maximum legal 
rate. 
In its exceptions, the District argues that there was an 
ambiguity in the ALJ's reference to "free" time in the 
stipulation and that what the District meant was time free from 
supervisory duties, although still work time, about which it had 
no duty to bargain when it imposed the supervisory requirement. 
The District's counsel, who did not represent the District at the 
conference, submitted an affidavit with the District's exceptions 
from the principal of Reese Road Elementary School setting forth 
his understanding of the teachers' responsibilities from 
8:00 a.m. to 8:10 a.m. prior to the issuance of the 
Superintendent's memorandum. The District further excepts to the 
Assistant Director's remedy, arguing first, that the teachers 
lost no wages because they were already paid for the time at 
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school from 8:00 a.m. to 8:10 a.m. and second, that maximum legal 
interest is 25% as set forth in Penal Law §190.40 and that, 
therfore, the order is in the nature of exemplary, or punitive, 
damages which PERB has no authority to order. 
For the reasons below, we affirm the Assistant Director's 
decision. 
It is clear from the stipulation that the facts upon which 
the decision below was based were adduced from the parties' 
pleadings and from their agreements at the pre-hearing 
conference. That stipulation was distributed to the parties 
prior to the reassignment of the case to the Assistant Director. 
The District had ample opportunity to clarify its interpretation 
of "free" time prior to the issuance of the Assistant Director's 
decision. Additionally, the District admitted in its answer that 
the period of time from 8:00 a.m. to 8:10 a.m. had been "free 
from any duty responsibilities".-7 The District cannot now, 
after the substitution of a different representative, argue 
persuasively that the characterization by the Assistant Director 
The District also excepts to the decision on the basis that 
it is inconsistent with an ALJ decision in Watertown City 
Sch. Dist.. 25 PERB f4689 (1992). That decision dealt with 
an allegation that duty-free time had been unilaterally 
reduced by the assignment of student supervision duties. 
The ALJ, finding that the charging party there had failed to 
establish that the time in question was duty-free time, 
dismissed the charge. Here, the District has admitted that 
the time from 8:00 a.m. to 8:10 a.m. had been free from any 
scheduled duties. The cases being dissimilar, the holding 
in Watertown is not applicable. Further, even if the cases 
were identical, the Board, while it might take note of, and 
adopt, the rationale in an ALJ decision, is not bound to do 
so. 
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of "free" time as "duty-free" time was in error, when that 
determination was based upon its own pleadings accepted as part 
of the record in this proceeding.-' 
The District further argues that the award of payment for 
the loss of "duty-free" time is inappropriate because the 
teachers were already scheduled to be at work during the time in 
question and were paid for each of those days. This argument 
misapprehends the nature of the violation found by the Assistant 
Director. The assignment of supervisory responsibilities from 
8:00 a.m. to 8:10 a.m. resulted in an increase in the teachers' 
assigned working time, for which they are entitled to be 
compensated. 4/ 
The District's exception to the Assistant Director's award 
of interest at the maximum legal rate is likewise rejected. We 
have adopted as our interest rate the interest rates set forth in 
CPLR 5004,-' and General Municipal Law §3-a, which are currently 
fixed at 9% per annum, not 25% as asserted by the District. 
There are no punitive damages in an award of interest at the 
rates prevailing in civil matters which evidence a legislative 
policy in an area similar to our decisions and orders. However, 
See United Fed'n. of Teachers and Bd. of Educ. of the City 
Sch. Dist. of the Citv of New York, 23 PERB 53042 (1990) . 
The affidavit submitted by the District in support of its 
exceptions is not part of the record on which the decision 
was based and it is not properly considered by us for the 
first time on appeal. 
County of Nassau, 24 PERB 53029 (1991); Addison Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 16 PERB 53099 (1983). 
5/ Westbury Teachers Ass'n, 14 PERB 53063 (1981). 
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to the extent that the District seeks clarification of the order 
of remedial relief, we will specify the amount of interest to be 
paid in accordance with the AKT's order. 
Accordingly, the District is hereby ordered to: 
1. Restore the practice of allowing teachers at Reese 
Road"""EI;ementa?y"School freet ime^  f rom 8:00 a.m. to 
8:10 a.m. 
2. Pay teachers at the Reese Road Elementary School who 
have had to forego such free time at their contractual 
rate of pay for each day that they have done so, plus 
interest at the rate of 9% per annum. 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
normally used to post communications to employees 
represented by the Association. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
;~ -f I-\ ( \ ^ A_ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Ju*Jx~2?.^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memfeer 
z, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees of the Frankfort-Schuyler Central School District represented 
by the Frankfort-Schuyler Teachers Association that the District will: 
1. Restore the practice of allowing teachers at Reese Road Elementary School free time from 8:00 a.m. to 8:10 a.m. 
2. Pay teachers at the Reese Road Elementary School who have had to forego such free time at their contractual rate of 
pay for each day that they have done so, plus interest at 9% per annum. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
FRANKFORT-SCHUYLER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, CAYUGA 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, LOCAL 191, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13270 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAMELA BRUCE of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (JULIE SANTIAGO of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Cayuga Correctional Facility, Local 191 (CSEA) to a decision by 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). In relevant part, the ALJ, 
after a hearing, dismissed CSEA's charge against the State of 
New York (Department of Correctional Services) (State), which 
alleges that the State violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) .-f 
-'•'The ALJ dismissed alleged violations of §209-a.l(d) and (e) of 
the Act, but no exceptions have been taken to the ALJ's decision 
in those respects. 
V 
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The charge stems from two unrelated, out-of-title grievances 
filed by unit employees. 
CSEA first alleges that Paul Hannigan, the Plant 
Superintendent at the Cayuga Correctional Facility (Facility), 
threatened an assembled group of maintenance employees, on 
October 31, 1991, with lowered performance evaluations because 
the unit president, Richard Franzcek, had filed a grievance. The 
grievance, filed on August 1, 1991, protested the assignment of 
allegedly supervisory duties to him and another unit employee. 
CSEA alleges that after he had referenced Franzcek's grievance, 
he stated that "future evaluations would reflect [the employees'] 
lack of cooperation." Hannigan testified that he spoke directly 
from a prepared text which states that some employees were 
continuing to "refuse to comply" with "facility policy regarding 
work hours and hanging out" and that he was no longer going to 
talk to them about it and instead he was "going to rate you 
appropriately in your evaluations." The ALJ did not decide what 
Hannigan said at the October 31 meeting. Instead, the ALJ 
dismissed this allegation on a finding that any statements 
Hannigan may have made to the employees were a response to long-
standing time abuses by employees, not Franzcek7s grievance. 
CSEA's second allegation centers on statements allegedly 
made by Hannigan to Franzcek and unit employees William S. Kemp 
and Bruce A. Rawleigh, informing Kemp, Rawleigh and another unit 
employee, Allen Avery, that they were no longer eligible for 
hazardous duty pay. According to Kemp and Rawleigh, Hannigan 
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told them that they could "thank Al Avery for losing this 
compensation because he had filed a grievance and his action 
would not have come about if Al hadn't done so." According to 
Hannigan, he told Kemp and Rawleigh, on behalf of Gary Anthony, 
Deputy Superintendent for Administration at the Facility, that 
"as a result of an investigation into a grievance . . . it was 
determined that you [the employees] were not eligible for 
hazardous duty pay." Franzcek's testimony regarding his 
conversation with Hannigan was to the same effect as Kemp's and 
Rawleigh's. In Hannigan's rebuttal to Franzcek's testimony, he 
reiterated that he only told Franzcek that the three employees 
were determined after Anthony's investigation to be ineligible 
for hazardous duty pay, an investigation which was probably 
prompted by Avery's grievance. Again, without deciding precisely 
what Hannigan had said, the ALT dismissed this allegation 
apparently on the ground that Hannigan's statements were 
ambiguous and read most reasonably to convey only that the 
hazardous duty pay was eliminated because the employees were 
discovered to be ineligible, not because the grievance was filed. 
CSEA's third allegation is that Kemp, Rawleigh and Avery 
were removed from the list of persons eligible for hazardous duty 
pay because Avery had grieved Hannigan's assignment to him of 
allegedly out-of-title work. The ALT dismissed this allegation 
on a finding that Anthony, not Hannigan, determined after an 
investigation that the employees were ineligible for hazardous 
duty pay, a conclusion endorsed on review by both Frederick 
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Richardson, Superintendent of the Facility, and the Budget and 
Finance Office of the State Department of Correctional Services 
(DOCS). Anthony received the grievance in due course of the 
parties7 grievance procedure and one of its allegations regarding 
inmate supervision caused him to guestion whether the established 
hazardous duty policy was being applied correctly. After his 
investigation, Anthony concluded that the duties of a motor 
vehicle operator and a motor vehicle mechanic were not performed 
a minimum of fifty percent of the time within the confines of a 
secure facility in the presence of inmates who did not have 
security clearances. The three incumbents of those positions 
were then rendered ineligible for hazardous duty pay. 
CSEA alleges in its exceptions that the record as a whole, 
including parts allegedly misconstrued or ignored by the ALJ, 
establishes that Hannigan twice improperly threatened employees 
and caused the three employees to lose their premium pay 
eligibility because grievances had been filed. 
The State in its response argues that the AKT's decision 
should be affirmed. 
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the ALJ's 
decision in part and remand it to the ALJ for subseguent 
decision. 
The ALT dismissed the first allegation because CSEA had 
failed to establish that Hannigan's statements to the assembled 
employees on October 31 were caused by Franzcek's grievance. 
This disposition, however, does not treat with the nature of 
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CSEA's first allegation. CSEA's first allegation rests upon a 
claimed threat to the exercise of protected rights. The question 
under that first allegation is not what caused Hannigan to speak, 
but whether his statements, as made and objectively considered, 
constituted an improper threat. The ALJ did not resolve what he 
characterized as "contradictory" testimony regarding statements 
made at the October 31, 1991 meeting. Therefore, the AKT's 
dismissal of the first allegation must be reversed. 
Similar reasoning necessitates our reversal of the ALJ's 
disposition of CSEA's second allegation. The ALJ again did not 
decide what Hannigan said to the employees, noting that "what was 
actually said is in serious dispute." 
Resolution of these fact questions is necessary to the 
disposition of these allegations because Hannigan's remarks are 
improperly threatening if they are as characterized by the 
employees. An employee's right to file and pursue a contract 
grievance is fundamental. As such, any statements by an employer 
to employees linking grievance activity to their employment 
relationship must be framed in terms which clearly convey to the 
employees that any job consequences caused by or taken in 
response to a grievance are not in retaliation for the grievance 
having been filed or prosecuted. Hannigan's statements, if as 
alleged by CSEA, left the employees with the impression that they 
would be disadvantaged financially and otherwise if they were to 
file a grievance. Whether Hannigan intended to convey that 
message is immaterial because the employees could not know his 
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state of mind. The violation rests upon the words as spoken, as 
objectively viewed in the totality of the circumstances. 
Alternatively, there is no violation if Hannigan's testimony 
were to be credited because, on his version of the events, there 
were no impermissible threats. It is, therefore, necessary to 
remand these two aspects of the charge to the ALJ for a 
determination as to what Hannigan actually said and whether, in 
light of our decision herein, those statements improperly 
threatened employees. 
We affirm, however, the ALJ's decision dismissing CSEA's 
allegation that the hazardous duty pay was eliminated because of 
the second out-of-title work grievance. As the State notes in 
its response, the ALJ's dismissal of this allegation rests 
substantially upon a credibility assessment of Anthony's 
testimony which is entitled to considerable deference and weight. 
There is no evidence that Anthony was improperly motivated in 
conducting his investigation or in reaching the conclusions that 
he did. There is, for example, no evidence that the established 
hazardous duty pay criteria were knowingly misapplied which would 
have arguably evidenced an improper motive. Indeed, CSEA's own 
recognition that Anthony did not know that Kemp and Rawleigh 
assisted in the preparation of Avery's grievance is persuasive 
that he did not remove the three employees from premium pay 
eligibility because of Avery's grievance, but simply because they 
were ineligible for the benefit. Although the information about 
the misapplication of the hazardous duty pay policy was first 
brought to Anthony's attention by Avery's grievance, he was 
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entitled to pursue that information and to act based upon the 
results of his investigation.-1 The entirety of the remaining 
evidence which CSEA argues establishes that Hannigan was actually 
responsible for removing the employees from hazardous duty pay 
eligibility is speculative and insufficient to set aside the 
ALJ's credibility determination. Having found that CSEA failed 
to establish that the employees were removed from premium pay 
eligibility because of and in retaliation for Avery's grievance, 
the ALJ correctly dismissed this allegation. 
For the reasons and to the extent set forth above, the ALJ's 
decision regarding the first and second identified allegations is 
reversed and the case is remanded to the ALJ for decision on 
those allegations consistent with our decision herein. The 
charge is otherwise dismissed. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
jk\A\^ KUr^ f L 
Paul ine R. K m s e l l a , Chai rperson 
Walter L. E i senbe rg , Member 
^Brunswick Cent. Sch. D i s t . , 19 PERB ^3 063 (1986) (endors ing 
ALJ's d e c i s i o n in S t a t e of New York. 17 PERB f4576 (1984) ) . 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by William T. 
Bruns to a decision issued by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing Bruns' charge 
against the State of New York (Governor's Office of Employee 
Relations) (State) and Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Council 82) 
as deficient. Bruns alleges that the State violated §209-a.l (a) 
and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
violating several provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement between the State and Council 82 dealing with out-of-
title work assignments, subcontracting and lodging reimbursement. 
Bruns also alleges that Council 82 violated §209-a.2(c) of the 
Act when it failed to pursue several grievances he had filed. 
On behalf of the Director, Bruns was advised by the 
Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
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Representation (Assistant Director) that the charge was deficient 
in that it alleged violations which occurred more than four 
months prior to the filing of the charge,-7 it raised issues 
already raised in earlier and still pending charges,-1 and it 
failed to plead specific facts in support of its conclusory 
allegations.-7 
Bruns filed an amendment on February 8, 1993, in which he 
acknowledged that several of the allegations in this charge are 
"similar" to allegations set forth in his earlier charges (Case 
Nos. U-12252 and U-13349), but he asserted that the violations 
are continuing. The remainder of the amendment refers to Council 
82,s September, October and December 1992 refusals to process 
certain of Bruns' grievances to arbitration and reiterates, 
without additional supporting facts, allegations of wrongdoing by 
Council 82 and the State. 
The Director dismissed Bruns' charge on three grounds. The 
charge was dismissed as untimely as to the events which occurred 
more than four months prior to the filing of the charge. As to 
those allegations which were either the same or similar to 
allegations raised in previous charges, and which Bruns asserted 
Rules of Procedure (Rules), §204.1(a)(1). 
Case No. U-12252 has been heard and is in the process of 
being decided by the assigned Administrative Law Judge and 
Case No. U-13349 is awaiting scheduling for hearing. 
3/ Rules, §204.1(b)(3). 
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were "continuing violations", the charge was dismissed as not 
setting forth a separate violation of the Act. As to the 
remaining, timely allegations, all of which had to do with 
Council 82's refusal to process several of Bruns' grievances to 
arbitration, the charge was dismissed for failure to plead 
specific facts which would evidence that Council 82's decisions 
were arbitrary, discriminatory or made in bad faith. 
Bruns argues in his exceptions that the Director's decision 
should be reversed as his charge is not deficient. Having 
reviewed Bruns' exceptions, we affirm the Director's dismissal of 
the charge. 
The allegations against the State all assert violations of 
the contract between Council 82 and the State and all relate to 
actions of the State taking place in August 1990.-' PERB has no 
jurisdiction to entertain alleged contract violations which do 
not also constitute improper practices or to enforce contract 
provisions.-' Further, the allegations are all untimely, 
occurring more than four months prior to the filing of the charge 
and are, therefore, dismissed. 
As to the allegations against Council 82, several are 
admitted by Bruns as being "similar" to allegations raised in 
These include Bruns' allegations against the State regarding 
out-of-title work, use of nonunit personnel to perform unit 
work, loss of overtime and failure to reimburse for travel 
expenses at the contractual rate. 
Act, §205.5(d). 
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Case No. U-12252.^ Other allegations relating to the handling 
of his Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) overtime claim by 
Council 82's retained counsel are the basis of his charge in 
Case No. U-13349. As these claims are the basis of improper 
practice charges already before PERB, they too must be 
dismissed.^ The propriety of Council 82's actions in these 
respects will be adjudicated in the context of the already 
pending charges. A second charge premised on the same grounds is 
unnecessary and inappropriate. 
The remaining allegations against Council 82 relate to its 
refusal to process to arbitration certain grievances brought by 
Bruns. The amendment filed by Bruns contains letters from 
Council 82 to Bruns explaining its rationale for denying his 
request that these grievances be arbitrated. Each details the 
reasons for Council 82's decision-7 and no other facts are 
alleged which would support a finding that Council 82 has 
breached its duty of fair representation to Bruns. Inasmuch as 
Bruns has failed to set forth facts which would establish that 
All deal with Council 82's failure to properly grieve 
alleged contractual violations. 
Although Bruns asserts that these are "continuing 
violations", they are actually reassertions of the same 
allegations contained in his earlier charges. That he may 
continue to be affected by the earlier complained of actions 
does not constitute a separate violation of the Act. Such 
an effect would, likewise, not constitute a "continuing 
violation". City of Yonkers, 7 PERB ^3007 (1974). 
Nassau Educ. Chapter of the Syosset Cent. Sch. Dist. Unit, 
CSEA, Inc., 11 PERB ^3010 (1978). 
Board - U-14203 -5 
Council 82 acted in an arbitrary, discriminatory or improperly 
motivated manner-7 in reaching its decisions regarding his 
grievances, those allegations must also be dismissed. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
affirmed and the exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
Eric 0". Schmertz, Member 
9/ Professional Staff Congress, 23 PERB [^3030 (1990) ; State of 
New York and New York State Public Employees Fed'n? 22 PERB 
13049 (1989). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Dutchess County Education Local #867, Arlington School District 
Unit (CSEA) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 
After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed CSEA7s charge against the 
Arlington Central School District (District) which alleges that 
the District violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) by ordering Theresa Davies, 
a part-time bus driver for the District, to submit to a drug 
test, a right afforded the District by an arbitration award 
rendered on a disciplinary grievance filed by CSEA on Davies7 
behalf. 
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A brief background is necessary to place this charge in its 
proper context. The District first ordered Davies to submit to a 
urinalysis drug test in September 1988 after receiving a 
deposition from an acquaintance of Davies that Davies had used 
cocaine on two occasions several months earlier in 1988. She 
tested positive for cannabinoids. Later in September 1988, the 
District issued Davies a notice of discipline which included 
allegations of drug use, excessive absenteeism, chargeable 
accidents and bringing an unloaded firearm onto District 
property. After a "name-clearing" hearing, the District 
terminated her. CSEA grieved Davies' termination pursuant to its 
contractual grievance procedure which ends in binding 
arbitration. It also filed an improper practice charge alleging 
that the District violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act when it 
unilaterally subjected Davies to a compulsory drug test. After a 
hearing, the arbitrator issued his decision in September 1989. 
The arbitrator ordered Davies reinstated without back pay 
effective September 18, 1989. The reinstatement, however, was 
conditioned upon the right granted the District to "randomly test 
Davies for drug use throughout the school year 1989-90 and to 
discharge her if she is found to be a substance abuser." Upon 
her return to work in September 1989, Davies was ordered to 
submit to a drug test. She refused and resigned her employment 
the next day. 
This charge was filed in November 1989, but it was held in 
abeyance pending our determination on the first improper practice 
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charge. On January 31, 1992, we issued our decision on that 
first charge.-' On a fact-specific analysis, we held the first 
drug test to be mandatorily negotiable because it was neither 
random nor grounded upon a reasonable suspicion of impairment. 
In shaping a remedy in that case, we took notice of the 
arbitrator's earlier award and did not order Davies reinstated 
with back pay in recognition of the arbitrator's findings and 
remedy. 
The ALJ dismissed this charge following our decision on the 
first charge. In dismissing the §209-a.l(d) allegation, the ALJ 
held that the District's order to Davies, issued pursuant to 
specific rights granted it by the arbitrator, was not unilateral 
in nature because the arbitration award represented the 
culmination of the parties' negotiated grievance procedure. In 
effect, the ALJ held that both parties were bound by the terms of 
the unappealed arbitration award because they agreed to that 
grievance procedure and CSEA invoked it on Davies' behalf. 
Finding no improper motivation in the District's implementation 
of the award, and no basis for any per se violation, the ALJ 
dismissed the §209-a.l(a) violation. 
In its exceptions and response to the cross-exceptions filed 
by the District, CSEA argues that the ALJ should have disregarded 
the arbitrator's award because it is repugnant to the Act and 
that its simple agreement to and use of a contractual grievance 
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. , 25 PERB J[3001 (1992) . 
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procedure does not evidence the necessary plain and clear waiver 
of bargaining rights. 
In cross-exceptions, the District argues that the ALT erred 
in failing to recognize the District's asserted right to order 
Davies to submit to a drug test apart from the rights granted it 
by the arbitration award and by refusing to permit the District 
to question Davies regarding the motivation for her resignation. 
It otherwise argues that the ALT's dismissal of the charge is 
correct. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ALT's 
decision. 
CSEA argues that this case is indistinguishable from the 
first if the arbitration award is treated as a nullity. In that. 
respect, CSEA argues that we should apply our standards for 
deferral to an arbitration award which include, in relevant part, 
a repugnancy criterion.-1 The arbitrator's award in this case 
is asserted to be repugnant to the policies of the Act. CSEA 
argues that the arbitrator could not give the District the 
unrestricted right to test Davies because we held subsequently 
that a targeted drug test, not grounded upon a reasonable 
suspicion of impairment, was mandatorily negotiable. 
Just as in its first charge, CSEA's refusal to bargain 
charge here rests upon a unilateral change theory. There can be 
no cause of action on that theory if the District is entitled to 
g/New York City Transit Auth. fBordanskv) , 4 PERB fl3 031 (1971) . 
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rely upon the arbitrator's award. As the ALT held, actions taken 
pursuant to the express terms of an arbitration award represent 
the culmination of a bilateral agreement establishing a complete 
system for the adjudication of disciplinary charges, the 
antithesis of unilateral action. As CSEA itself recognizes, a 
reversal of the ALJ's decision necessitates that we treat the 
arbitration award as a nullity. CSEA and the District, however, 
bestowed upon the arbitrator broad power to fashion the 
appropriate penalty in disciplinary cases in which just cause for 
discipline was found to exist. Review of that award is available 
under Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) Article 75. To avoid 
our becoming a substitute for or an alternative to the statutory 
review procedures, a CPLR proceeding should be the preferred 
mechanism for the review, modification or vacatur of disciplinary 
arbitration awards, absent extraordinary circumstances. CSEA 
argues that a circumstance sufficient to warrant our review is 
presented in this case because the award is repugnant to the Act. 
We find, however, no repugnancy in the arbitrator's award. 
The alleged repugnancy of the arbitration award lies in the 
arbitrator's reliance, in part, upon the results of the September 
1988 drug test. The test, it is argued, had to be bargained and 
it was not. Therefore, we should disregard the award entirely 
because it is based in part upon the improperly obtained results 
of that test. The arbitrator's award, however, was also based on 
incidents unrelated to the drug test, including Davies' admitted 
use of marijuana on at least one earlier occasion, her admission 
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that she had at least once permitted cocaine in her home, 
evidence that she had been present when cocaine was used by 
others, and her bringing of an unloaded handgun onto school 
property. We have no way of knowing the extent to which these 
factors may have influenced the arbitrator's decision to 
condition Davies' reinstatement on the District's right to test 
her for drug use. We do know that it was not solely the drug 
test which shaped the arbitrator's award and we cannot, on that 
basis, find any necessary repugnancy in the award. 
We must also recognize the differences between our statutory 
proceedings and disciplinary arbitrations. The issues in the 
improper practice proceeding and in the grievance were simply not 
the same. The issue before us was essentially a scope of 
negotiations question. The issue before the arbitrator was 
whether there was just cause for Davies7 discipline and, if so, 
what the appropriate penalty should be. In our first decision in 
this case, we held only that the targeted drug test had to be 
bargained because it was not grounded upon a reasonable suspicion 
of impairment. We did not hold that the result of the test could 
not be properly considered by an arbitrator in the context of a 
disciplinary arbitration which had been completed before our 
decision issued. Indeed, we suggested the contrary in our first 
decision when we modified our typical remedial order so as not to 
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"alter the rights and duties which the parties acquired and 
assumed under their contract.11-7 
Public policy considerations also warrant denial of the 
request to nullify the arbitration award in this case. If we 
were to deny the District the right to test Davies for drug use 
pursuant to the arbitrator's award, we would undermine all of the 
policies which favor the negotiation and utilization of 
contractual grievance procedures. We would also disturb the 
finality of the process the parties negotiated for their mutual 
benefit. 
There may be some few number of arbitration awards so 
plainly and clearly inconsistent with the Act that these would 
not warrant our deferral to any extent or for any purpose.-7 
This, however, is not such a case. 
The dismissal of the §209-a.l(a) allegation is affirmed for 
the reasons stated by the ALT. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed and CSEA's exceptions are denied. Our affirmance of the 
ALJ's decision makes it unnecessary to consider the District's 
cross-exceptions. 
i725 PERB ^3001, at 3006. 
-
7See, e.g. , Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth. , 20 PERB J[3066 
(1987); Barton Brands, 135 LRRM 1022 (1990) (employee's 
reinstatement conditioned upon his not serving as a union 
official for three years). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
iLine R. Kinsella,Chai Paul ne nsella, C rperson 
Walters* L. Eisenberg s , Member 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Erie County Local 815, Erie County White Collar 
Employees Unit (CSEA) appeals from an Administrative Law Judge's 
(ALJ) decision dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, CSEA's 
charge against the County of Erie (County). CSEA alleges in its 
charge that the County violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused to pay a 
unit employee for time spent in traveling to a meeting related 
to his job after the employee's workday had ended. The ALJ had 
earlier deferred, pursuant to our decision in Herkimer County 
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BOCES,-7 consideration of the jurisdictional question-' pending 
the arbitration of a grievance which CSEA had filed. By award 
dated June 10, 1992, the arbitrator dismissed the grievance, 
finding that the County had not violated the contract. The 
arbitrator found that the County had an established practice of 
paying employees portal-to-portal travel pay. He concluded, 
however, that under §38.3 of the parties' contract, the County 
had the unrestricted right to change its travel policy from time 
to time and that the County had, in April 1991, changed its 
policy to deny employees travel pay in the relevant 
circumstances. 
Section 38.3 of the parties' contract, entitled "Travel 
Policies", provides as follows: 
The policies and procedures covering expense for 
employees conducting official County business are 
reflected in the Rules and Regulations issued by and on 
file in the Budget Office of the County of Erie as 
amended by the Budget Office from time to time. 
After receipt of the arbitrator's award, CSEA moved to 
reopen the charge which had been conditionally dismissed by the 
ALJ. In the decision now on appeal, the ALJ accorded 
"substantial weight" to the arbitrator's decision and dismissed 
the charge for lack of jurisdiction. CSEA argues that the award 
I720 PERB f3050 (1987). 
-''Section 205.5(d) of the Act denies PERB jurisdiction over 
alleged violations of an agreement or the enforcement thereof. 
Board - U-12756 -3 
is repugnant to the Act and it should not be, therefore, the 
basis for a jurisdictional dismissal. The alleged repugnancy is 
found in the arbitrator's implicit conclusion that CSEA 
effectively waived by agreement to §38.3 any right to further 
bargaining regarding such changes in the travel policy as the 
County may make from time to time. The County has not filed a 
response to CSEA's exceptions. 
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the ALJ's 
decision dismissing the charge for lack of jurisdiction, but we 
nonetheless decline to reopen the charge. 
The initial question before us at this time is whether we 
have jurisdiction over CSEA's charge. We have consistently 
interpreted the jurisdictional limitation in §205.5(d) of the Act 
to be applicable only if the contract is a reasonably arguable 
source of right to the charging party with respect to the subject 
matter of its charge.-7 Until Herkimer County BOCES, charges 
were often unconditionally dismissed for lack of jurisdiction any 
time the charging party had filed a grievance related to its 
improper practice charge because we considered the filing of the 
grievance to represent an implicit admission by the charging 
party that the contract afforded it rights with respect to the 
issues in dispute under the improper practice charge. In 
Herkimer County BOCES, we simply exercised our discretion to 
defer consideration of the jurisdictional issue to arbitration in 
^County of Nassau; 24 PERB ^3029 (1991). 
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much the same way as we defer consideration of the merits of a 
charge within our jurisdiction. Our deferral, however, does not 
alter the nature of the jurisdictional question and, as we are 
without power to consider charges outside the scope of our 
jurisdictional grant, we, not an arbitrator, are responsible for 
making the jurisdictional determination. Under Herkimer County 
BOCES, therefore, an arbitration award is merely an aid to our 
determination of that jurisdictional question. 
Bearing in mind the nature of the jurisdictional inquiry, 
the first issue to be decided is: What is the arbitrator's 
interpretation of the contract. If the contract provisions are 
not a grant of right to CSEA in relevant respect, the charge is 
within our jurisdiction. 
The arbitrator held that §38.3 of the contract afforded the 
County the unrestricted right to fix its travel compensation 
policy and practice at any time. The circumstances here are 
essentially the same as those in State of New York-Unified Court 
System (hereafter UCS).-' There, as here, the contract clause 
vested the employer with total discretion regarding the subject 
of the improper practice charge. As such, CSEA does not have in 
this case, any more so than in UCS, any basis to claim that its 
contract has been violated. Therefore, the ALJ's dismissal for 
lack of jurisdiction must be reversed. 
-
725 PERB ^3035 (1992). See also Cairo-Durham Cent. Sch. Dist., 
25 PERB 53059 (1992). 
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The arbitrator's interpretation of §38.3 of the parties' 
contract is also relevant to our declination to reopen the 
charge. In that respect, repugnancy arguments are clearly 
relevant under our deferral policy, first articulated in New York 
City Transit Authority.-7 There is no claim that the issues 
were not fully litigated before the arbitrator or that the 
proceedings were in any way unfair or irregular. As requested by 
CSEA, the arbitrator construed the language of §38.3 in light of 
the other subsections of §38 of the parties' contract. He 
concluded from that review that §38.3 of the contract clearly and 
unambiguously gave the County the right to amend its travel 
policy in relevant respect. In considering whether this award is 
repugnant to the Act, our decision in UCS^ is again 
dispositive, as it was on the jurisdictional question. In that 
case, we concluded that the contract, which gave the employer 
unrestricted discretion regarding the grant of paid leave for a 
certain purpose, effectively waived CSEA's rights to further 
bargaining and deprived it of any unilateral change cause of 
action. As already noted, the circumstances here are 
indistinguishable. Having ourselves found a waiver in similar 
circumstances, the arbitrator's conclusion here cannot be said to 
be repugnant to the Act. 
^4 PERB 53031 (1971) . 
-'Supra note 4. 
Board - U-12756 
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the ALJ's 
jurisdictional dismissal, grant CSEA's exceptions in that 
respect, but deny its motion to reopen the charge. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
llctUcu ^ 
gasjs 
Walteji L. Eisenberg, Memb 
Eric J/. Schmertz, Membe 
/ 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Joseph Dennis 
to a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director). Dennis7 first charge (U-143 00), filed 
on February 11, 1993, alleges that the Civil Service Employees 
Association (CSEA) violated §209-a.2(a) and (b) of the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act). The charge refers to 
actions by CSEA at different dates in 1992, the gravamen of which 
is an alleged breach by CSEA of its duty of fair representation. 
On behalf of the Director, the Assistant Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) 
informed Dennis that he had no standing to allege a violation of 
§209-a.2(b) of the Act pertaining to a union7s duty to bargain in 
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good faith with an employer. Although the duty of fair 
representation allegations are cognizable under §209-a.2(a) of 
the Act, Dennis was informed that those allegations were untimely 
to the extent they concerned actions before October 11, 1992, and 
were otherwise not supported by allegations of fact. 
Dennis then filed a second charge, apparently intending to 
amend and correct the first charge. Dennis was informed, 
however, that the first charge was still deficient, as was the 
second. When Dennis declined to withdraw the charges, the 
Director dismissed them. 
Dennis excepts to the Director's decision finding him 
without standing to allege a violation of §209-a.2(b), finding 
his charge untimely as to events occurring more than four months 
before his charges were filed and finding that his charges lack 
the factual specificity required by our Rules of Procedure 
(Rules). 
CSEA in its response argues that the Director's decision is 
correct and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments on appeal, we affirm the Director's decision in part 
and reverse and remand in part. 
We affirm the Director's decision regarding standing and 
timeliness for the reasons set forth in his decision. We also 
affirm his dismissal of certain of Dennis' allegations as 
factually deficient. Many of Dennis' general allegations of 
coercion, interference, racism and discrimination are wholly 
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conclusory. Section 204.1(b)(3) of our Rules requires a clear 
and concise statement of the facts constituting the alleged 
improper practice including names, dates and places of each 
particular act pleaded as a violation. Dennis7 conclusory 
allegations do not satisfy this requirement of the Rules. 
However, not all of his allegations are deficient on this basis. 
Having reviewed the charge as filed and as amended, we find the 
following allegations to have been pleaded with sufficient 
specificity to meet the requirements of §204.1(b)(3) of our 
Rules: an allegation that on or about November 30, 1992, CSEA 
agents in its regional office had no contact with Dennis despite 
his telephone calls; an allegation that in November 1992, Linda 
Williams, another CSEA representative, was unprepared to 
represent him on a grievance; an allegation that on November 23, 
1992, CSEA incorrectly handled a grievance by referring to a 
different grievance in its response; and an allegation that on 
December 9, 1992, a CSEA assistant contract administrator would 
not accept a valid grievance. These several allegations were 
sufficient to give CSEA fair notice of the actions intended to be 
proved as violations of its duty of fair representation by 
fixing, with reasonable specificity, names, dates and places. If 
CSEA is unable to reasonably frame an answer to these allegations 
on the basis of the information provided in the charge, it has 
recourse to a motion for particularization of the charge under 
§204.3(b) of the Rules. By reading a charging party's pleading 
requirement in §204.1(b)(3) of the Rules in conjunction with the 
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procedural rights afforded a respondent by our Rules, we believe 
we best protect the rights of a charging party to an opportunity 
to pursue a proper complaint while simultaneously ensuring that a 
respondent is not unreasonably burdened by allegations which are 
not susceptible to informed response. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
affirmed except as to the four allegations listed above, as to 
which his decision is reversed and the charge in those respects 
is remanded for further processing in accordance with this 
decision. In all other respects, IT IS ORDERED that the charge 
must be, and hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
j 
/ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
2J- 9/21/93 
In the Matter of 
OGDEN HOURLY EMPLOYEES, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4099 
TOWN OF OGDEN, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 1170, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF 
AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
SHEILA M. SICHAK, for Petitioner 
GAY H. LENHARD, for Employer 
LINDA MCGRATH, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On May 6, 1993, the Ogden Hourly Employees (petitioner) 
filed a timely petition for decertification of Local 1170, 
Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (intervenor), the 
current negotiating representative for employees in the following 
unit: 
Included: Payroll Clerk, Clerk III w/typing-Police Dept., 
Nutrition Coordinator (part-time), Clerk-Typist-
Town Clerk's Office (part-time), Clerk III 
w/typing-Town Clerk's Office, Court Clerk, 
Nutrition Site Aide (part-time), Dog Warden, 
Clerk III w/typing-Recreation, Assistant 
Assessor, Clerk-Typist-Police Dept., Assistant 
Building Inspector, Clerk-Typist-Building Office 
(part-time), Clerk III w/typing-Building Office, 
Maintenance Mechanic III, Clerk-Typist-Highway 
Dept. (part-time), Clerk III w/typing-Assessor 
Office. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Certification - C-4099 Page 2 
Upon consent of the parties, an on-site election was held on 
July 26, 1993. The results of this election show that the 
majority of eligible employees in the unit who cast valid ballots 
no longer desire to be represented for purposes of 
collective negotiations by the intervenor.^ 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and it 
hereby is, decertified as the negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
Of the 19 ballots cast, 6 were for representation and 13 
against representation. There were no challenged ballots. 
3A- 9/21/93 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OP CRAWFORD POLICE OFFICER'S 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
TOWN OF CRAWFORD, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Crawford Police 
Officer's Benevolent Association has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
CASE NO. C-4112 
Certification - C-4112 
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collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time police officers. 
Excluded: Chief of Police, Sergeants and all other 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Town of Crawford Police 
Officer's Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
f^u-lL. T-J<irqgJL 
Pauline R. Kinsel la , Chairperson 
3B- 9/21/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF WARWICK POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
—and^ CASE NO. C-4117 
TOWN OF WARWICK, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Warwick Police 
Benevolent Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4117 
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Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time police officers, 
detectives and sergeants. 
Excluded: Chief of Police, dispatchers and all other 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shallnegotiate collectivelywith the Town of Warwick Police 
Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
^Z 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
Eric J. Schmertz, Me: 
3C- 9/21/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF DELHI POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
VILLAGE OF DELHI, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE FEDERATION OF POLICE, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Village of Delhi Police 
Benevolent Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
CASE NO. C-4123 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time police officers. 
Excluded: Chief of police and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collect-i-ve-l-y with the Village o# Delhi Pol ice 
Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
^ 
Pauline R. Kmsel la , Chairperson 
3D- 9 /2 i /93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MONROE POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4126 
VILLAGE OF MONROE, 
Employer, 
-and-
TRI-COUNTY FEDERATION OF POLICE, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Monroe Police Benevolent 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4126 
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Unit: Included: All full-time police officers, including 
detective/youth officer. 
Excluded: Chief of Police, sergeants and all other 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Monroe Police Benevolent 
Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
.ine R. Kirisella, Chai Pauli nsel rperson 
OtcMa^y. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
3E- 9/21/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
Town of Blooming Grove Superior Officer's 
Council, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
Town of Blooming Grove, 
Employer, 
-and-
United Federation of Police, Inc., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Blooming Grove 
Superior Officer's Council has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
CASE NO. C-4127 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: 
Included: Sergeants 
Excluded: Chief of Police and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT- IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Town of Blooming Grove 
Superior Officer's Council. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
3F- 9/21/93 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF FISHKILL POLICE FRATERNITY, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4128 
TOWN OF FISHKILL, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE FEDERATION OF POLICE, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Fishkill Police 
Fraternity, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All part-time police officers. 
Excluded: Chief Executive Officer, Lieutenant and 
Commissioners of Police. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Town of Fishkill Police 
Fraternity, Inc. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
h^tx~Z-^k*l 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
3G- 9/21/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MONROE SUPERIOR OFFICER'S COUNCIL, 
Petitioner, 
-and— CASE NO. C-412 9 
VILLAGE OF MONROE, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Monroe Superior Officer's 
Council has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: Sergeants 
Excluded: Chief of Police, full-time and part-time police 
officers and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Monroe Superior Officer's 
Council. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Msfmber 
Erijzf J. Schmertz, Member 
3H- 9/21/93" 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW PALTZ POLICE ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO .C-4130 
TOWN OF NEW PALTZ, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE 
OFFICERS INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the New Paltz Police Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
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settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time police officers, 
including sergeants. 
Excluded: Chief of Police, commissioned officers and all 
other employees. 
FURTHER,__IT ..IS__ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the New Paltz Police 
Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
f J > ^ k id ivsq u^ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
CUM^X 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF CORNWALL POLICEMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and-
TOWN OF CORNWALL, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Cornwall Policemen's 
Benevolent Association, Inc., has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, 
in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
CASE NO. C-4131 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time police officers. 
Excluded: Chief of Police and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Town of Cornwall 
Policemen's Benevolent Association, Inc. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
3J- 9/21/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
Village of Saugerties Police Benevolent 
Association, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4135 
Village of Saugerties, 
Employer, 
-and-
United Federation of Police Officers, Inc., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Village of Saugerties Police 
Benevolent Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
Certification - C-4135 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All uniformed members of the police department, 
including the rank of sergeant, all 
investigators and employees of the department. 
Excluded: Chief of Police, school crossing guards and 
special patrolmen. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Village of Saugerties 
Police Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chaifperson 
u&Mz. 7fr 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memfeer 
3K~ 9/21/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OP UNITED 
INDUSTRY WORKERS, DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4105 
HEMPSTEAD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service 
Employees Union, Local 424, A Division of United Industry 
Workers, District Council Local 424, has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
Certification - C-4105 
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below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: Groundskeepers, maintenance helpers, 
cleaners, maintainers, senior maintainers, 
messengers, bus drivers, all head custodians, 
supervising groundskeepers, maintenance 
supervisors, custodians. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union, Local 424, A Division of United Industry 
Workers, District Council Local 424. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
#4'^k.g|l. 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
r L. Eisenberg, Membe 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 808, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4042 
PORT WASHINGTON WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED, that Local 808, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Sewer Servicer-, Laborer, Senior Sewer Serviceman, 
Sewer Plant Attendant and Plant Operator. 
Excluded: Director of Operations, Operations Foreman, 
Manager, Foreman, Clerical, including the Sewer 
Plant Attendant in the Office of the Director of 
Operations, and all other employees of the 
District. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 808, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times...and conferi in good faith with respect towages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any other question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: September 21, 1993 
Brooklyn, New York 
Pauli 
#rJ>.L^..lc,.vttA 
Lne R. Kinsella, Chairj 
UiAstx^Y. 
person 
Walter^L. Eisenberg, Membe, 
